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i. Introduction and Multi-element Study Approach.
An aerobrake is a structure that utilizes the drag of a body
to reduce the speed of a vehicle as it moves through an
atmosphere. However, "aerobrake" is somewhat of a misnomer
in the sense that a body normally generates lift as well as
drag. In practice, the lift generated can play a very
important role in the use of the aerobrake Direction of
flight can be changed by use of the lift aid, hence,
modulation of the drag can be accomplished, final landing
location can be affected, or orbital parameters can be
changed. In the Space Exploration Initiative, all other
things aside, some minimum vehicle set operates in a round
trip mode: from Earth-to-Moon-to-Earth or from Earth-to-Mars-
to-Earth. On arrival at the Moon or Mars or return from Moon
or Mars to Earth, a vehicle must be decelerated from the high
cruise speed to be captured properly into orbit or to land on
the surface. To reduce the interplanetary speeds, the
kinetic energy of the incoming vehicle must be exchanged or
dissipated. Exchange is accomplished by allowing the vehicle
to intercept and use the planetary atmosphere to convert the
vehicle kinetic energy into thermal energy. Using a
propulsive burn requlres propellent to be carried outbound
and on return. Using an aerobrake also requires some
overhead in the aerobrake mass, although less than that for
the propellent. Moreover, the aerobrake must be capable of
absorbing and dissipating a great deal of heat, requiring
specialized materials. Aerobraking offers limited control,
even utilizing lift, and is generally restricted to one pass
through the atmosphere. With too large an entry angle,
vehicle penetration is too deep and the vehicle burns up.
With too small an entry angle the dissipation is insufficient
to effect the desired capture and the vehicle may be lost.
Entry accuracy is obviously critical and, because there may
be no second chance, there are major points of concern.
For propulsive braking, the required deceleration burns are
also critical, requlrlng the operation of an engine which may
have been used several times and has been idle over a
considerable time.
The use of aerobraking has been proposed to be used in
several different stages of the Lunar or Mars missions:
First, in the precursor Lunar technology and science mission
phase, the Lunar Transfer Vehicle (LTV) returns to the earth
where it aerobrakes into an orbit properly phased for
rendezvous with Space Station Freedom (SSF) or directly into
a descent trajectory for landing. Second, in one scenario
for the proposed manned Mars mission, the Mars Transfer
Vehicle (MTV) separates into two vehicles, both of which use
aerobrakes larger than those required for the LTV. The Mars
Excursion Vehicle (MEV) aerobrakes further into a descent
trajectory for landing. After the Mars ascent stage rejoins
the MTV, the two begin the flight back to Earth, where the
MTV aerobrakes into Earth orbit. Even then, the crew
utilizes a Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) to land on Earth via
aerobraking. It can readily be seen that only the Mars entry
plus Earth return stages, and the Earth return from the Moon
into SSF compatible orbit, represent steps not already well
developed in the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs.
Various studies have shown that the use of an aerobrake as
part of spacecraft design for both the LTV and MTV offer
substantial weight savings over a purely chemical propulsion
approach. In the case of the MTV the weight savings could be
as much as fifty percent which reduces the mass of the MTV
down to the 500-800 tonne range. The case for the LTV, while
not as dramatic, is still significant. Studies have shown
that using aerobrake can yield nearly twenty per cent savings
in "initial-mass-in-low-earth-orbit," (IMLEO). The actual
mass saving depends on the final mass fraction of a real
aerobrake capable of meeting all system requirements.
Because the earliest use of aerobraking in the SEI scenarios
was for Lunar missions, with the Lunar Transfer Vehicle based
at SSF, and because the LTV aerobrakes were of more modest,
practical sizes, it was decided that the current studies
would focus on Lunar missions. Mars missions would be
considered later, with the understanding that the concepts
and techniques identified from the Lunar aerobrake missions
would be extendable to the Mars applications.
The "Aerobrake Assembly with Minimum Space Station
Accommodation" study was divided into three phases. The
first phase was completed in October 1990. The second and
third phases were run simultaneously, starting in early 1991
and completed in early 1992.
The objective of the first phase of the study was to
establish feasibility and to define the major areas requiring
detailed study. The second study phase was undertaken to
develop detailed understanding of the issues identified in
the first phase and, thereby, to generate the elements of
an engineering conceptual design of an on-orbit assemblable
(and maintainable) aerobrake consistent with Space
Exploration Initiative requirements as then understood.
Integrated with respect to time in the second study _hase was
an effort (the third study phase) to identify potentlal
laboratory and flight experiments. These would yield the
validation of design and analysis efforts from the second
study phase. In addition, manpower and resource requirements
were to be developed to permit management decisions with
respect to which of the recommended technology activities
might be pursued.
By its very concept, the second study phase content was to be
several individual activities involvlng disparate disciplines
related only in the focus of specific analysis and design of
the SEI aerobrake. It was determined from the very outset
that the ultimate relevance of such a multidisiciplinary
study effort hinged upon a solid set of requirements and a
properly coordinated set of assumptions.
The approach taken to satisfy these objectives was to execute
a set of individual studies, interlocked by means of a
propagation of requirements and results. In addition a
separate activity was organized that represented an
overarching integration whose purpose was to resolve broad
technical issues across the entire study, and to serve as a
design synthesis group. Moreover, the integration team
provided interface to the next higher level in requirements
definition at Marshall Space Flight Center.
During the existence of the integration team effort several
technical issues were addressed, and it is the purpose of
this report to present the results of the more important
investigations.
The organization of the study was made up of six parts as
illustrated in figure I.l. The aerobrake integration
function whose purpose has been described above was
responsible for serving as interface back to MSFC to ensure
that the aerobrake being studied was one that met the
requirements for the Lunar Transfer Vehicle. In addition the
integration activity was responsible for interpreting the
MSFC requirements to the rest of the study participants. The
major study elements were: Study Integration, Aerobrake as
Vehicle, Thermal Protection System, Structural Design,
Inspection and Verification, and On-orbit Dynamics and
Accommodations.
The second study area, Aerobrake as Vehicle, had as its
objective the definition of the aerobrake as a "flying
machine" capable of supporting the mission requirements of
the Lunar Transfer Vehicle. Thus, this activity was
concerned with the lunar return trajectories, the shape of
the aerobrake, its L/D, the pressure loads, the size of the
aerobrake, wake impingement, flight stability, G loads, and
the heating and heat loads.
The third study area, thermal protection, was concerned with
designing a thermal protection system capable of withstanding
the Earth's atmosphere heating associated with the Lunar
return trajectory. In addition this study area extended the
investigation of the expected heating to include such things
as non-equilibrium radiation heating, CFD analysis for flow
fields, and radiative and convective heating for this large,
blunt aerobrake shape for which there is limited flight data.
The fourth study area, structural design, took the maturing
results from the Aerobrake as Vehicle and worked in
conjunction with the Thermal Protection System study to
produce a conceptual design capable of supporting the return
trajectory forces, interfacing to the Lunar Transfer Vehicle,
being assembled on-orbit, and supporting the required thermal
protection system. All of this taken wlthin the context of a
constrained mass fraction for the aerobrake.
The fifth study area was related to inspection and
verification of the aerobrake and was concerned with a more
complete look at inspection requirements and techniques than
was done in the first study phase. Included in this area was
a consideration of the effects of orbital debris and
micrometeroid impacts, external and internal sensors (with a
considerably expanded look at non destructive evaluation,
embedded sensors), and reviews of Shuttle Orbiter inspection,
verification, and refurbishment practices.
The sixth study area defined the robotics and operations
support required to assemble, inspect, refurbish, and
maintain the aerobrake. This study area, in effect, added
the dynamics of the associated supporting operations to the
aerobrake as a complete system. During deflnition of the on-
orbit assemblable structure, this stud[ area was required to
maintain close cognizance and cooperatlon with the structures
definition to ensure appropriate accommodations for robotics
systems•
• Lunar Transfer Vehicle and Aerobrake Derived
Requirements.
The relevance of this stud[ is built on a propagated set of
requirements whose source is the next higher level of NASA
mission definition activity. In the SEI case the designated
lead for the Lunar Transfer Vehicle has been Marshall Space
Flight Center. Marshall was responsible for developing the
LTV and MTV concepts and thereby generating a set of
requirements that the LTV and MTV subsystems must meet. The
aerobrake, a major subsystem, was thus given "high level"
performance requirements to fulfill.
It should be noted that the aerobrake study being reported
was directed at the lunar mission alone, but there are
compelling reasons, to be discussed later, for direct
relationships to the Mars Mission.
5It is these high level requirements that are then given
interpretation and definition to yield both an aerobrake
concept and a further propagation to still more basic
subsystems. By means of the above technique, it is possible
to trace each activity back up a chain that responds to a
"higher level" requirement.
The MSFC activity consisted of study contracts and in-house
concept development that generated a vehicle (the Space
Transportation Vehicle, or STY) derived from the "so-called"
Stage and One-half of the original "90-Day Study."
Unfortunately, the detailed selection of a baseline LTV
faltered in some important stages of the s[nthesis process
because of the restructuring of Space Statlon Freedom and
other reasons. Thus, as this study intensified, the required
LTV definition process stalled. The vehicle definition had a
fairly well defined set of gross physical characteristics:
outline, dimensions, mass allocations, number of engines,
crew and payload module concepts. However, there were two
competing concepts from the stud[ contractors and only an
informally synthesized NASA verslon. Consequently certain
major uncertainties remained: On which side of the aerobrake
the propellant tanks were attached, whether the aerobrake
went to the Lunar surface or not, and what the major
mechanical interfaces of the aerobrake to LTV "core" were, to
name some of the larger ones.
Nevertheless, the aerobrake study team, in conjunction with
the MSFC STV study team were able to focus on an LTV concept
that was more than adequate to ensure solidly useful results.
Given such things as a very reasonable size and mass of the
LTV and the requirement to rendezvous with SSF, for example,
it is possible to develop a Lunar return trajectory. Such a
trajectory would in turn yield pressure loads, heating, and
pressure profiles. Because the trajectories compatible with
an SSF return require a low L/D, they are fairly insensitive
to modest changes in vehicle shape and mass, the study
results were guaranteed to yield results very close to
whatever similar vehicle might ultimately be chosen.
Shown in Figure II.2 is the Lunar Transfer Vehicle used for
this study. Included as Table II.l are the appropriate mass
allocations and dimensions of the LTV. The total mass of the
LTV is 21.5 tonnes and the aerobake mass is 4.3 tonnes.
3. Aerobrake Shape Selection.
6One area that received considerable attention was the
selection of an aerobrake shape. A fairly obvious overall
system optimization would appear to be the selection of an
aerobrake shape that would be both acceptable in flight
characteristics and simultaneously well adapted to on-orbit
assembly. Given a set of aerobrake shapes that are similar
in performance and a set of shapes, some better adapted to
on-orbit assembly than others, a major trade-off would be to
strike a "best" balance between flight and assembly.
One result from the Phase I study was the presumed
desirability of a minimal number of different parts required
to assemble the aerobrake and if many parts are required,
they should be interchangable. Given the fact that launch
costs are expected to be a major fraction of overall cost, a
high degree of commonality was expected to reduce spares and
enhance launch packaging requirements. Moreover, the more
different parts, the more difficult the manufacturing and
verification, as well as the probability of more complex on-
orbit operations tasks.
The initial thoughts were that the more symmetrical the
aerobrake, there would follow an increase in parts
commonality. By extension, the expectation was that the most
symmetrical shape, a spherical section, would yield the
highest degree of commonality. Other shapes such as
ellipsoids or the complex shape of the Aeroassist Flight
Experiment, which has sections of prolate hyperboloids, and
ellipsoids, as examples would be expected to be less
characterized by parts commonality.
It became clear later in the study that the first thoughts
on which shapes yielded the greatest commonality were
erroneous. Based on the early reasoning, the spheroid was
selected for analysis in meeting the mission flight
requirements. As noted in the related report "Minimum
Accommodation Aerobrake Assembly-Vehicle Analysis," a
spherical section can work well as an aerobrake shape.
Several guidlines grew out of the Phase I Study (essentially
a feasibility study) which were felt would have ultimate
influence on the "best" integrated aerobrake design. In
order to begin the _rocess of detailed definition, it was
important to determlne which of the apparently adequate
aerobrake concepts identified in the Phase I Study should
receive most attention. The hope was that one concept was
the far-and-away leading candidate, allowing a reduction in
options.
A set of criteria were identified that were felt to capture
the major end-to-end aerobrake design considerations. These
criteria were: (i) Thermal Protection System and Structural
Commonality, (2) Structural concept, (3) Assembly Difficulty,
7and (4) Operations Support. The first of these refers to the
desire to have as few different parts as possible to ease the
problem of on-orbit spares and inventory complexity. The
second of these, Structural Concept, refers to the inferred
difficulty to produce a particular structure vis-a-vis some
other. The third is self-evident, while the last, Operations
Support referred to the difficulty in launch support, on-
orbit operations, complexity in inspection systems, support
systems, etc. It is interesting to note that the partlcular
aerobrake concept selection was not a major factor in the
aerobrake performance or mass.
Inherent in the identification of the above criteria was the
clear knowledge that they were not of equal importance. The
integration team proceeded to develop a weighting for each
area to yield the final rankings. Moreover, because the TPS
and Structure Commonality were felt to be sufficiently
different, a ranking was first developed and then the two
were recombined before the weights were applied. Shown in
Table 3.1 are the categories and their weights along with the
final ranking of the aerobrake shapes. The shapes were the
ones developed during the Phase I Study and represent a
complete cross-section of the proposed aerobrake shapes
compatible with the SEI Lunar mission.
The final ranking showed only that the very complex shape of
the Aeroassist Flight Experiment was clearly a loser while
the Spheroid and Sphere-cone were close together and at the
top. The final decision was to maintain the Spheroid and
Sphere-cone as the two options for this study. This
selection was passed on to the study group doing an
assessment of flight characteristics to determine detailed
performance.
4. Baseline Deflection and Tile "Pop-Off" Limits.
One important input to the structural analysis study in this
group was the question of how much deflectlon of the
aerobrake was permissible. The question of deflection
represents a derived requirement since it does not come from
the MSFC vehicle concept development, and is, rather, a
direct result of the pressure loads experienced during the
(model) trajectory. Moreover, the deflection has two major
and unrelated impacts: First, the deflection causes a
distortion of the aerobrake surface, which, it must be
assumed, is covered by some thermal protection system. In
general, thermal protection systems are rigid and applied in
sections. Thus, the possibility of the thermal protection
system "popping off", on the one hand{ or separating and
allowing hot gas to penetrate to the inner mold line on the
other hand, exists. Second, the deflection of the aerobrake
has the effect of possibly allowing the hot shock wave to
envelop parts of the Lunar Transfer Vehicle, affectin_ the
minimum required aerobrake size and hence mass and fllght
characteristics.
The approach taken to quantify the "pop-off" was to rely on
the only currently existing practice in this general area:the Orblter. While it was understood that the TPS selected
for LTV application might represent a somewhat different
case, requlrlng reassessment at a later time, sufficient
similarities were expected to warrant this approach.
There are a few interesting points to note concerning the
Orbiter tiles. First, the tiles are not rigidly attached to
the Orbiter inner mold line. Instead, the tiles tend to
"float" on the Orbiter skin. Aerodynamic pressure durin_
reentry tends to press the tiles against the Orbiter, while
tangential flow tends to try to dislodge the tiles. A very
blunt shaped aerobrake similar to the one in this study would
be expected to experience very little tangential flow.
Second, in the case of the Orbiter, the dominant source of
flow into the intertile regions would be a pressure
differential. Flow would carry hot gas to the inner mold
line, so "gap filler" is used as a preventative. In a case
of no pressure differential or very low flow, the expectation(subject to laboratory or other test verification) would be
that the gap filler mlght not be needed if some way could be
found to prevent direct heating.
What was required for the study to proceed was a
specification on the amount of deflection the aerobrake
structure could accommodate without inducing some failure in
other important subsystems. The largest first order effects
of deflection on the aerobrake come from the increasing
curvature as the aerobrake experiences a pressure load and
the possible effect of wake closure in impinging on the LTV
core. The integration activity attacked both of these
questions.
The tile debonding was studied by first establishing the
tolerance limits in Orbiter practice. Discussions with
Orbiter Processing Facility staff and with Rockwell
International employees yielded information that indicated
there would be two problem areas: First, an increase in the
tile-to-tile separation and second, a stretching of the
bonding material due to increasing curvature at the inner
mold line.
As shown in Figure 4.1 the force load on the aerobrake is
modelled as a simple change in the curvature of the
aerobrake. This curvature, in turn, displaces the tiles from
their original positions giving rise to a new top to bottom
tile separation (gap) and a pulling away of the inner mold
line from the tile bottom. The latter would be expected to
be greatest at the outer edges of the tiles, assumlng equal
bonding elasticity. A simple analysis shows that for small
ratios of deflected-to-normal effective radii, the amount of
gap increase is as shown in Table 4.1. Even for normalized
radii of curvature variations as high as 0.5 (defined as r/r 0
the resulting radius of curvature dlvided by initial radius
of 45 feet) the gap only increases to 0.147" Orbiter pillow
type gap insulators are capable of compression (expansion) of
0.180", adequate for the required 0.147" at the 0.5 r/r 0
ratio and well satisfying the requirement at the lower
values. Note that the assumed tile width was one meter and
the tile separation varies linearly with tile width.
For tile debonding, the case is similar, with the results of
the calculations shown in Table 4.2. In that table, it is
seen that the debonding excess gap only approaches that of
the original gap when the curvature ratio approaches
0.5 r/r 0. It should be noted again that the calculations
were done for a tile width of one meter, and that the gap
varies directly as the square of this tile dimension.
5. Tile Shape and Commonality.
One important aspect of the selection of the aerobrake shape,
mentioned above, was the desire to maximize commonality of
the various component parts. As will be discussed later, it
became less important to achieve this commonality, but even
so, it was and remains a desirable goal.
One very numerous subelement of the aerobrake is obviously
the thermal protection system tiles. While the initial
integration of the tiles with the structure appears to be
best done before launch, repair and refurbishment entails the
expected replacing of some or all the TPS tiles.
Consequently a considerable effort was made to minimize the
number of differently shaped tiles, and this section will
present the results of this surprisingly difficult task.
A very naive approach to shape would assume that something
similar to the shapes that tile ("tesselate") common surfaces
would be appropriate. For example, hexagonal shapes will
cover a plane surface perfectly and might be expected to be
able to do the same thing for the aerobrake. However, simple
geometric considerations show that the hexagons cannot cover
the curved surface and keep the same shape. If a series of
rings is started on a section of a sphere, for example, it is
readily found that the circumference of the rings must vary
and that they do so without maintaining an integer
relationship. Moreover, the outer circumference for a
particular ring of hexes is different from the inner ring.
Hence the hex's cannot remain hex's and fill the area.
The problem is more fundamental still and is related to the
problem of solid geometry of creating solids from identical
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polygonal figures. That this is so follows from the
construction which would solve the current tessellation
problem. The solution consists of simply circumscribing a
sphere on a regular polyhedron and projecting the polygonal
faces onto the sphere's surface. Such a construction would
create curved, identical areas on the sphere's surface, each
of which would be the TPS shape.
Unfortunately, there are only five regular polyhedra, called
the Platonic solids. These are the tetrahedron (four faces),
hexahedron (six faces), octahedron (eight faces),
dodecahedron (twelve faces), and icosahedron (twenty faces).
For an aerobrake based on a spherical section whose total
area would be near 2200 square meters, a reasonable tile size
of approximately 0.5 square meter would require a Platonic
solid with 4400 faces.
Other classical polyhedra with groups of different shapes
exist and are called the thirteen Archimedian solids.
Unfortunately these too are limited to only a few tens offaces.
Another approach was investigated based on the modern
architectural constructions developed by R. Buckminster
Fuller: Geodesic Domes. Geodesic Domes were originally
developed from great circle arcs, but were generalized so
extensively that _reat circle arcs almost completely
disappeared, leavlng only the name. Geodesics commonly take
as their starting point the icosahedron or dodecahedron and
6. Integrated Aerobrake Design Selection
As the multipart study progressed, certain initial
plausibilities began to erode. On the other hand, certain
other guiding concepts began to emerge. This section will
present what grew to be a set of overarching principles
resulting from the synthesis activity. These princlples were
referred to as the Grand Canonical Assumptions with an
apology to Statistical Mechanics. The Grand Canonical
Assumptions represent six heuristic conclusions and are
listed in Table 6.1.
The first of these reflects the fact that the amount of
squared velocity change for a SSF rendezvous is the same as
for an Orbiter reentry. However, the rendezvous with SSF
represents a much shorter and sharper heating pulse than in
the Orbiter case. In addition, the Orbiter experiences
primarily convective heating while the aerobrake-Lunar
Transfer Vehicle endures high radiative heating. Because the
shock wave stands off from the aerobrake and there is only a
small (per unit area) flow, it was decided by the
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integration team to ignore flow into the tile gaps. This
assumption, backed by experience with NASP-Iike experiments,
allows the elimination of any requirement for "gap-filler"
such as used in the Orbiter. For the model LTV aerobrake,
the approach was tile overlap, backed up by a requirement of
laboratory experiments to confirm the assumption. One of the
concerns in uslng gap-filler is the inspection, repair, and
refurbishment on-orbit in zero-G and in the confines or
neighborhood of SSF. As to be discussed later, there is
ample reason not to aid in the proliferation of debris
external to SSF. The difficulty of extracting and replacing
the gap-filler inside SSF makes it a complex task.
The next Canonical Assumption is that the aerobrake can be
put together easily, but only the TPS is designed for ease of
assembly and disassembly. This assumption results from
consideration of the results of an on-orbit event that would
make it necessary to repair some part of the aerobrake
structure. Because of the critical role that the aerobrake
plays in LTV survival, the question of reuse of a damaged
aerobrake is one of considerable importance. After some
physical problem severe enough to require rebuilding, it is
difficult to see how it would be possible to develop
sufficient confidence that all damage was satisfactorily
repaired. Therefore, it was decided to assume that the
aerobrake structure would be designed to be disassembled, but
only with times compatible with disposal.
A question that arose from time-to-time concerning the
benefits of deployable or in toto launched aerobrakes versus
an on-orbit assembled one gave rise to the third Assumption.
In considering options other than assembly, it became clear
that for a multiple use aerobrake some rather substantial
accommodation structure would be required. On the other hand
it was found that forms of the erectable aerobrake could fit
in the Orbiter, a Titan IV or possibly smaller vehicles.
Given the dominating requirement for multiple uses and the
attendant support structure, it was felt that it was only a
small step to assemble the aerobrake with the same hardware.
On the other hand, launching an aerobrake in toto requires a
specially modified launch vehicle (greater than 14 meter
shroud) or some development of a (possibly removable)
deployment mechanism with the use of a whole Heavy Lift
Launch Vehicle (HLLV) for this one purpose.
Canonical Assumption four captures the progression of
technology from the Lunar Missions to the Mars Missions.
Options to perform the SEI Missions show the possibility of
bypassing SSF with HLLV's for the Lunar Mission, eliminating
the need for assembly, reuse, or other operations at SSF.
However, the Mars Missions, involving vehicles (including
nuclear) all are in the IMLEO mass range of 500 metric tons
or greater. No HLLV's exist or are currently proposed that
are capable of launching such vehicles into orbit. On-orbit
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assembly, checkout, fueling and other o_erations will be
required. Thus, recurrent Lunar operatlons based at SSF are
obvious candidates for use in developing the technology andtechniques to enable the Mars Missions.
Assumption five refers to the belief that it is less costly
to reuse a vehicle than to replace it given the two options
are reasonably close in performance and cost. An example is
the suggested use of an ablator-expendable aerobrake rather
than a reusable one.
Assumption six refers to the fact that the concern over on-
orbit assembly times and complexity for a multiple reuse
aerobrake ignore the fact that overall operations are
dominated by the refurbishment and reflight activities.
Assembly is a one time activity which can be accomplished in
parallel with other activities. The length of time required
to assemble an aerobrake when prorated over its operational
lifetime yields a considerable effective mitigation of
assembly overhead.
7. Debris.
A consideration thought to be of major impact was the
question of on-orbit debris. During the period of time
encompassing the Phase I study activity and the beginning of
the Phase II study, the Space Station Freedom Program was
still in a very active consideration of the problem of on-
orbit debris, including the development of program and
_roject policies and requirements. To be more precise, the
issue was both on-orbit debris and the far better known
problem of micrometeors. It is important to note the latter
point because the debris issue had grown to such proportions
that the far better documented danger of micrometeors had
tended to recede from consideration.
To better assess the problem of on-orbit damage, several of
the Phase II study participants attended a short course. The
short course was intended to develop an analytical under-
standing related to on-orbit debris and micrometeors.
In addition, the study activity was fortunate to be able to
examine raw results from the LDEF experiment related to on-
orbit damage. Both of the above mentioned activities will be
reviewed, as well as the expected importance either or both
might play. In addition, some comments related to the more
general question of on-orbit damage from all sources will be
presented.
8. Recapitulation and Summary
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It is worth noting at the conclusion of this part of the
suite of reports some of the overall findings with regard to
the LTV aerobrake. The major impetus behind the use of
aerobraking was the reduction in the amount of IMLEO
propellent since a minimized aerobrake mass fraction allows
the maximum IMLEO savings. The goal for the structural and
thermal protection system studies was to keep the mass
fraction of the aerobrake below 25 percent. The two study
areas mutually apportioned target mass fractions with a small
reserve for items such as avionics, thrusters, and so forth.
The final mass fraction resulting from thermal protection
system, structural design and overhead items was 22 percent.
The actual IMLEO savings for the baseline LTV can only be
estimated without additional study, however from past studies
it is to expected that the savings would be in the 18-20
percent range.
9. Conclusions
This six-part study was done to provide depth to the Phase I
Study (reference i) and to continue the assessment of the
practicality of a Space Station Freedom-based Lunar Transfer
Vehicle-Aerobrake design. The depth to which this study went
might be considered similar to a phase A study in
conventional project activity. Moreover, certain parts were
at a level commensurate with a phase B study. In effect, a
"baseline" aerobrake concept was generated which is
sufficient to identify necessary advanced development
activities. Concepts were generated for the shape of the
aerobrake, its thermal protection system (including robotics
and automation systems,) realistic trajectories, heating and
pressure profiles, and detailed structural analysis and
assembly concepts and designs.
It is the conclusion of this work that a Lunar transfer
vehicle based at Space Station Freedom and incorporating an
aerobrake is feasible from an engineering perspective. It is
also the conclusion of this study activity that the aerobrake
can be maintained for five or more reuses, including a
five-reuse ablator option. Some areas of concern remain in
the discrepancies among various CFD-driven equilibrium and
non-equilibrium heating models. The mix of radiative and
convective heating has not yet been determined to be within
comfortable bounds. Nevertheless, there was sufficient
agreement to permit the selection of a thermal protection
system with adequate margin to encompass the expected
heating.
Finally, it should be noted that the conce_t of using a "hot
structure" made up of carbon-carbon composltes was only
briefly considered. Time did not permit the investigation of
this very interesting alternative. The potential benefits of
14
a composite aerobrake are such that further work in
developing a detailed assessment would be well worth while .
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Candidate Aerobrake Shapes
Spheroid
AFE Shape
Sphere-cone
Biconic
Ellipsoid
Weighting
Criterion
TPS and Structure Commonality
Structural Concept
Assembly Difficulty
Operations Support
Weiqht
32%
29%
29%
10%
100%
Final Ranking
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
ShaDe
Spheroid
Sphere-cone
Biconic
Ellisoid
AFE Shape
Score
4.00
3.84
3.06
2.11
1.34
Table 3.l-Initial Selection Criteria, weightings, and
rankings for aerobrake shapes.
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Deflected to Undeflected
Radius of Curvature Ratio
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.6
0.7
0.5
Increase in Gap Width(Inches)
0.0 xl0 -3
15.0 "
33.0 "
57 . 1 "
88.9 "
133 . 0 "
Table 4.1a
Deflected to Undeflected
Radius of Curvature Ratio
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
Lift-Off
(Inches)
0.0 xl0 -3
40.0 "
92.0 "
156.0 "
244 .0 "
365.0 "
Table 4.1b
Tile thickness:
Undeflected aerobrake radius:
Tile width:
Undeflected Gap:
2 inches
45 feet
3 fee_
133xi0 -_
Table 4.1-(a) Variation of tile-to-tile gap as a function of
aerobrake effective radius of curvature ratio, and
(b) tile lift off versus radius of curvature
ratio.
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The large blunt shape has little intertile flow and
mostly radiative heating. The Lunar aerobrake is not
the Shuttle.
The aerobrake and the TPS can be assembled easily, but
only the TPS is designed to be disassembled easily.
The infrastructure required to support the assembly of
the aerobrake is the basis for the refurbishment
infrastructure.
The development of techniques and infrastructure of the
Lunar aerobrake enable major Mars mission operations
elements.
Reusablility where possible, expendability where
necessary.
Refurbishment operations outweigh single-shot assembly
operations.
Table 6.1- Some major underlying heuristics resulting from,
and guiding, the Phase II Study integration
process.
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Minimum Accommodation
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Figure l.-Outline of the multidisciplinary study process.
Arrows indicate the flow of interim engineering
results and generally indicate the more fundamental
drivers by the lower numbers.
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Figure 2.-Schematic of the Single P/A (propulsion/avionics)
design concept developed by Marshall Space Flight
Center. This concept served as the basis for the
aerobrake design study.
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Figure 3.-Illustration of intertile and the tile-to-
inner mold line "pop-off" effects. Decrease
in radius of curvature causes greater severity
in the extent of separation and gap.
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